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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

DUCKWORTH V. DEANE: DENIAL OF INTERVENTION IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF MARYLAND CODE,
SECTION 2-201 OF THE FAMILY LAW ARTICLE IS
APPROPRIATE WHEN THE PARTIES ATTEMPTING TO
INTERVENE DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
RULES FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT OR PERMISSIVE
INTERVENTION.
By: Ashley Recker
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that denial of intervention
in a constitutional challenge of Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl.
Vol.), section 2-201 of the Family Law Article, prohibiting issuance of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, was appropriate because the
parties attempting to intervene did not meet the requirements of the
rules of intervention of right or permissive intervention. Duckworth v.
Deane, 393 Md. 524, 529, 903 A.2d 883, 886 (2006). In doing so, the
Court of Appeals prevented intervention by the Clerk of the Court of
Anne Arundel County, eight Maryland state legislators, and one
Mary land resident, maintaining that the interests of these parties were
adequately represented by the Attorney General of Maryland. [d.
On July 7, 2004, nineteen plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City against multiple county clerks for denial of
marriage licenses after having submitted the proper paperwork. The
marriage licenses were denied because the applicants were same-sex
couples. The defendants, all clerks of the court from various counties,
were represented by the Attorney General of Maryland. Three
separate motions to intervene were filed in this case. The first motion,
filed by Robert P. Duckworth ("Duckworth"), Clerk of the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, sought intervention and the right to
be represented by privately retained counsel. Eight members of the
General Assembly of Maryland, all represented by their privately
retained counsel, filed the second motion to intervene. The third
motion to intervene was filed pro se by Toni Marie Davis ("Davis"), a
resident of Baltimore City. Each of the three motions filed claimed a
right to intervene and, alternatively, sought permissive intervention.
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The circuit court denied all three motions to intervene. Duckworth,
the eight members of the General Assembly of Maryland, and Davis
all filed timely notices of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari, prior
to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, to review the issue of
whether denial of intervention was appropriate.
On appeal, Duckworth limited his challenge to whether he had a
right to intervene by his own privately retained counsel. Duckworth,
393 Md. at 534, 903 A.2d at 889. The Court reviewed sections 6106(b) and (c) of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code,
which provides that "the Attorney General is the legal adviser of and
shall represent ... each officer and unit of the State government... [and]
an officer or unit of the State government may not employ or be
represented by a legal adviser or counsel other than the Attorney
General." Duckworth, 393 Md. at 536, 903 A.2d at 890 (quoting MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 6-106(b)-(c) (West 2006)). The Court
noted that there are multiple exceptions to this statutory requirement,
but none are applicable in the case at bar. Duckworth, 393 Md. at 537,
903 A.2d at 890. Duckworth further argued his interest in the
litigation is "personal," so as to circumvent the statutory requirement
that he must be represented by the Attorney General. [d. The Court
did not accept Duckworth's assertion of "personal" interest to enable
him to intervene because the interest he cited in his motion, the
issuance of marriage licenses, relates entirely to his performance as
Clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. [d. at 537-38,
903 A.2d at 890-91.
The eight members of the General Assembly of Maryland first
relied on Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(l), which allows intervention "when
a person has an unconditional right to intervene as a matter of law."
Duckworth, 393 Md. at 538, 903 A.2d at 891. The Court refers to the
federal counterpart to Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(l), which is Rule
24(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and "applies only
when a statute or ordinance specifically confers an unrestricted right to
intervene in a particular type of case." Duckworth, 393 Md. at 538,
903 A.2d at 891. Federal Rule 24(a)(l) serves as a guide to the
interpretation of the Maryland intervention rule. Duckworth, 393 Md.
538, 903 A.2d at 891. Using this guide, the Court found that there is
no Maryland statute, applicable to any of the legislators, which
specifically confers upon them an "unrestricted right to intervene," and
therefore, the Court reasoned that Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(l) did not
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permit intervention of the legislators in this case. Duckworth, 393 Md.
at 539,903 A.2d at 891.
In accordance with Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), the legislators
asserted an interest in this constitutional challenge because the
outcome of the case may impair their ability to protect their
lawmaking interest. Duckworth, 393 Md. at 539,903 A.2d at 891-92.
Additionally, the legislators feared that the Attorney General would
not adequately represent that interest. [d.
The standard promulgated in Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) requires
more than a generalized interest in the pending action, in order to
permit a party to intervene. Duckworth, 393 Md. at 539, 903 A.2d at
892 (citing Montgomery County v. Bradford, 345 Md. 175, 199, 691
A.2d 1281, 1293 (1997)). The legislators must have a direct interest in
the disposition of the constitutional challenge in order to intervene
under Rule 2-214(a)(2). Duckworth, 393 Md. at 539,903 A.2d at 89192 (citing Montgomery County, 345 Md. at 199, 691 A.2d at 1293).
The Court has held that an interest that is speculative, remote, and
indirect is insufficient. Duckworth, 393 Md. at 539, 902 A.2d 892. In
Raines v. Byrd, the United States Supreme Court held that "six
members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress" because the individual
members had no greater interest in the challenge than that of the
general public. [d. at 541, 902 A.2d 892-93 (quoting Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 829-30, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2322 (1997)). In the case at
bar, the General Assembly of Maryland may have a right to intervene,
but because only eight members sought intervention, the Court viewed
them as individuals with no greater interest in the challenge than that
of the general public. Duckworth, 393 Md. at 540, 903 A.2d at 892.
Additionally, in order for the legislators to intervene under Rule 2214(a)(2), they must have standing to be a party such that the
disposition of the action would cause them to suffer a type of special
damage, which differs from that suffered by the general public.
Duckworth, 393 Md. at 540, 903 A.2d at 892 (citing Medical Waste v.
Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 613, 612 A.2d 241, 249 (1992)). The
legislators' interest in the disposition of this constitutional challenge is
the same interest held by the general public. [d.
The Court also pointed out that even if the interest of the legislators
was strong enough to garner intervention as a matter of right under
Rule 2-214(a)(2), "[the legislators] do not meet the additional
requirement of the Rule that their interest may not be adequately
represented by existing parties." Duckworth, 393 Md. at 542, 903
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A.2d at 893. The legislators claimed that the Attorney General is
sympathetic to the constitutional challenge but provide no support for
this argument. [d. at 542, 903 A.2d at 893. There is also no support
for the argument that the Attorney General will decline to appeal in the
event of an adverse trial court decision. [d.
The legislators' final argument to show the inadequacies of the
Attorney General's representation, was that he was unwilling to argue
the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [d. at 543, 903
A.2d at 894. The Court indicated that this separation of powers
argument put forth by the legislators is frivolous because the judiciary
has long been authorized to rule on the constitutionality of any
enactment by the General Assembly. [d.
Davis' argument on appeal was identical to the one set forth in her
motion to intervene, claiming that the outcome of the litigation "will
affect not only [her] everyday life, but the everyday lives of every
resident in Maryland," including the ability to protect personal
religious beliefs. [d. at 540, 903 A.2d at 892. In order to intervene,
individuals must show an interest greater than that of the general
public. [d. at 540-41, 903 A.2d at 892. Davis not only failed to show
that her interest in the litigation was greater than that of the general
public but also failed to demonstrate that her interests were not
adequately represented by the existing defendants. [d.
By holding that denial of intervention in a constitutional challenge
of Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 2-201 of the Family Law
Article is appropriate, the Court has affirmatively limited the parties
involved in litigation. The constitutionality of a statute denying samesex couples the right to marry is an issue currently pending before the
Court. The limits this holding placed on intervention, specifically
concerning the interest an outside party has in the disposition of the
case, will ensure that the Attorney General of Maryland, an elected
official, can litigate this constitutional issue as he sees fit. The
Attorney General has a duty to competently represent his constituents,
the citizens of Maryland and if the Attorney General's representation
is inadequate, the remedy will be obtained through the election
process, not intervention.

